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State of Utah should affirm the order of the trial court
dismissing defendant's counterclaim for failure to diligently
prosecute the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 1, 1956, Reliance National Life Insurance
Company (hereinafter Reliance, or plaintiff), entered into an
employment agreement with James E. Caine (hereinafter Caine or
defendant), whereby Caine was employed as an agency supervisor
for Reliance. After approximately five months, a dispute arose
between the parties which resulted in the termination of Cainefs
employment on August 20, 1956, and the initiation of this action
on October 12, 1956.

In the action, after various amendments to the

pleadings, Reliance sought to recover $6,762.63 from Caine for
money advances, charges to Reliance's account, and insurance
premiums collected by Caine but not paid to Reliance.

Caine

filed a counterclaim which after various amendments to the
pleadings ultimately sought an accounting and a judgment for any
commissions which the accounting might show.
Cainefs original counsel withdrew on October 2,
1957.

After Reliance had served Notice of Readiness for Trial

on January 23, 1960, new counsel appeared for Caine and the
matter proceeded to trial on a piecemeal basis during 1960. On
January 5, 1961, the District Court entered a memorandum decision
that Reliance was entitled to judgment in the sum of $6,762.63,
and that no complete accounting was ever furnished to Caine.
-2- '
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On December 19, 1964, new and third counsel appeared
for Caine, alleging that certain matters were still before the
court for determination.

However, in March of 1966, Caine's

third counsel withdrew before any further proceedings in the
matter were entered in the record.

A fourth counsel for Caine filed

a motion on April 22, 1967, to re-open the case for trial or
alternatively, to enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment.

Finally, nearly eleven years after the action

was commenced and seven years after trial, Reliance's counsel
prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, which
were signed by the Court on May 3, 1967. The judgment awarded
Reliance $6,762.63, plus costs, and dismissed Caine!s Counterclaim.
Caine gave notice of appeal on May 29, 1967. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court on
March 28, 1968 and remanded for a new trial.
During this course of events, Reliance was merged
into National Western Life Insurance Company (hereinafter
National) with headquarters in Austin, Texas. Neither counsel
for Reliance nor counsel for National attempted to go forward
with a new trial after the decision of the Supreme Court, and
did not file any pleadings or take any steps with regard to this
matter, until notified of defendant's motion to set date for
new trial during October of 1975.
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Caine filed no pleadings and apparently took no
other action after the Supreme Court decision until his Motion
to Set Date for New Trial was filed by another new counsel, the
fifth for Caine in this matter, on October 17, 19 75.

Defendant's

Motion came within a week of the nineteenth anniversary of the
filing of this action, and seven and one-half years after the
decision of the Supreme Court was handed down reversing the
decision of the District Court.
National is not aware of the availability of any
of the witnesses to the 1956 events which gave rise to this
action, with the exception of Caine.

National cannot now locate

any files, records, accountings, evidence or other material with
respect to this action.

Former counsel for plaintiff has been

dead for over six years.
ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THIS ACTION
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE PURSUANT TO RULE 41
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO PROSECUTE HIS
COUNTERCLAIM.,
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1972)
provides:
Involuntary Dismissal. Effect
thereof for failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of
an action or of any claim against him. . .
Unless the court in its order for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision . . .
operates
as an adjudication upon the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
merits.
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It is clear that dismissal on motion of a plaintiff of a
defendant's counterclaim for failure to prosecute is included
within Rule 41(b).

Rule 41(c), U.R.C.P. (1972), provides:

Dismissal of Counterclaim, CrossClaim or Third-Party Claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to
the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim.
See also, Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 2d 389,
335 P.2d 624, 626 (1959).
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly reviewed
dismissals for failure to prosecute. In the case of Brasher
Motor & Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969),
the plaintiff had brought a complaint sounding in replevin seeking
the recovery of several automobiles. After the sheriff made a return
swearing that the property could not be found, the defendants
filed a lengthy counterclaim which plaintiff immediately moved
to dismiss.

The matter was then laid to rest by both parties

for five and one-half years.

After this delay, defendants suddenly

attempted to reactivate the matter.

On his own motion, the trial

judge dismissed the entire case. The Supreme Court held that
even without looking to Rule 41, the trial court had discretion
to dismiss an action for want of prosecution on its own motion
and that the court had not abused its discretion in this case.
More recently, in Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29
Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the
'•

- 5 -
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants1
motion to dismiss under Rule 4 K b ) . The plaintiff had brought
an action seeking an injunction and damages against several
defendants for alleged interference with the flow of water in
plaintiff's ditch.

About one year after the original complaint

was filed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint.

About four and one-

hald years later, plaintiff filed a motion to file a second
amended complaint.

Plaintiff did not pursue that motion but

over two years later, moved that the case be set for pretrial.
On motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the action
for failure to diligently prosecute.

The Supreme Court's

opinion noted that during the seven and one-half years from
filing of the complaint to motion for pretrial, there had been
some settlement talks between the parties, although defemdants
had not offered a compromise.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Vanjonora v. Draper,
30 Utah 2d 364, 517 P.2d 1320 (1974), again addressed the question
of dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Filing a complaint in

September, 1969, plaintiff was awarded judgment in October, 1971.
Nevertheless, the trial court set aside the judgment in May,
1972.

Subsequently, new counsel for the respective parties was

substituted and numerous offers and counteroffers of settlement
were made.

Finally in December, 1972, the trial court granted

defendant's Motion to Dismiss as plaintiff could not be contacted
by his counsel in order to set a trial date.

The Supreme Court
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held that the trial had abused its discretion in dismissing the
action stating:
This court only looks to the
period after judgment was set aside
in its determination as to whether
the trial court abused its discretion
in ordering a dismissal for failure
to prosecute. 1x3. at 1322.
The short period of time involved, the substitution of counsel,
and the negotiations between the parties collectively indicated
that dismissal was inappropriate.
Finally, in Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor, Inc.,

Utah 2d

.

, 544 P. 2d 876,

879 (1975), the Utah Supreme Court concluded:
Whether there is such justificable
excuse is to be determined by
considering more factors than
merely the length of time since
the suit was filed. Some
consideration should be given
to the conduct of both parties,
and to the opportunity each has
had to move the case forward and
what they have done about it; and
also what difficulty or prejudice
may have been caused to the
other side; and most important,
whether injustice may result from
the dismissal.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that dismissal should not
have been granted due to the extensive discovery involved and
defendant's failure to examine documents placed at its disposal.
(Only 3 years had passed since plaintiff's complaint has been filed).
Under the facts of the case at bar, it is clear
-7~
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that defendant had as much responsibility as plaintiff to prosecute
the action after the reversal by the Supreme Court over seven and
one-half years ago,

24 Am. Jur. 2d, Dismissal §23 at 20-21.

Nevertheless, defendant has not initiated settlement negotiations,
he has not sought interim discovery.

His only claim*seemingly

insufficient by itself, is that he has had difficulty in finding
substitute counsel.

Defendant's inaction since the Supreme Court

reversal has resulted in a severe hardship to plaintiff.

Its

business has been taken over, its counsel has died, and it
is now unable to locate any material or evidence with respect
to defendant's counterclaim.

As plaintiff in no way hampered

prosecution of defendant's claim, plaintiff was entitled to have
this action dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41, U.R.C.P. (1972).
II.
DEFENDANT IS BARRED FROM SEEKING EQUITABLE
RELIEF BY THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
The law in Utah on laches is quite clear and
comprehensive.

In Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugarhouse

Shopping Center Associates,

Utah 2d

, 535 P.2d 1256

(1975), the Supreme Court said:
Laches is not mere delay, but delay
that works a disadvantage to another.
To constitute laches, two elements
must be established: (1) The lack
of diligence on the part of plaintiff;
(2) An injury to defendant owing to
such lack of diligence. Although
lapse of time is an essential part
of laches, the length of time must
depend on the circumstances of each
case, for the propriety of refusing
a claim is equally predicated upon
the
of
prejudice
suffered
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by defendant and the length of
plaintiff's delay. [525 P.2d at 12602.
In Rutherauff v. Silver King W. Mining & Milling,
95 Utah 279, 300, 80 P.2d 338, 347 (1938), the court said:
. . . If the complainant has been
guilty of laches, a court of equity
will not look into the transaction
at all. It requires conscience,
good faith and reasonable diligence.
These wanting, the court will remain
passive and leave the parties where it
finds them.
An action for an accounting where a fiduciary relationship exists is an equitable action.

Newton v. Tracy Loan & Trust

Co., 88 Utah 547, 40 P.2d 204 (1935).

Therefore, defendant's

counterclaim for an accounting is subject to the equitable bar
of laches. Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 56
Utah 449, 191 P. 426 (1920).
In the case at bar, defendant's lack of diligence in
prosecuting his counterclaim is manifest from the record.

For

seven and one-half years prior to the filing of defendant's Motion
to Set Date for New Trial, there is a total absence of any action
by defendant with respect to his claim.

Furthermore, National

has never been approached by defendant for any reason during the
seven and one-half year period even though Reliance was merged
into National prior to the filing of the appeal in 1967.
With respect to the injuries and prejudice caused to
plaintiff by defendant's delay, a recitation of the facts manifests
the inequity of allowing defendant to proceed after his long
delay.

Plaintiff is not now able to locate any accounts, records,
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claim*

Plaintiff is not now aware of any witnesses to the

transactions which gave rise to the defendant's claim, with
the exception of the defendant himself.

Plaintiff's former

counsel, who represented Reliance for the first twelve to
thirteen years of proceedings in this matter, including the
original trial, is unable to help reconstruct evidence or accounts
because he has been dead for over six years.
In Bumingham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 107, 245 Pac. 977,
983 (1926), the court said:
•..•'•. . Ordinarily, whether laches
exists is dependent upon the
particular facts and circumstances of the case. While
delay is an important factor
yet mere delay, unless unreasonable
or inexcusable, is not enough;
and of equal importance are the
circumstances occurring during the
delay, the relation of the parties
to the subject, disadvantages
that may have come through loss
of evidence . . . or injury from
other causes. [Citing cases. Emphasis
supplied.]
Plaintiff has lost evidence and has maintained no
relation to the subject matter during defendant's delay.

Even

if that were not the case, it would seem extremely difficult
at best for defendant to show that his delay was reasonable or
excusable.

Defendant's belated attempt to revive his counter-

claim is clearly barred by laches.

. . .[A] court of equity should always
insist upon reasonable diligence and not
-10-
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.encourage stale claims and thus
open the doors of our courts to
those who have slept upon their
rights. Jones Mining Co. v.
Cardiff Mining & Milling Co.,
.56 Utah 449, 469, 191 Pac. 426
(1920)•
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's
Judgment dismissing the Complaint and Counterclaim, which were
filed nearly twenty years ago, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

JAMES P. COWLEY
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
351 East Second South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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